

# FLAW OF AVERAGES

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## Outline

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- **What is the concept?**
- **Why is it important in practice?**
- **When does it occur?**
  
- **How to avoid**

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## THE CONCEPT

## Flaw of Averages

- **Presentation explains a fundamental problem in the design and evaluation of systems**
- **This problem is the pattern of designing and evaluating systems based on the “average” or “most likely” future projections**
- **Problem derives from misunderstanding of probability and systems behavior, known as**

### **FLAW OF AVERAGES**

## **Flaw of Averages**

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- | **Named by Sam Savage (“Flaw of Averages, Wiley, New York, 2009)**

**It is a pun. It integrates two concepts:**

- | **A mistake => a “flaw”**
- | **The concept of the “law of averages”, that that things balance out “on average”**
- | **Flaw consists of assuming that design or evaluation based on “average” or “most likely” conditions give correct answers**

## **Mathematics of Flaw**

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- | **Jensen’s law:**
- |  **$E [ f(x) ] \leq f [ E(x) ]$  if  $f(x)$  is convex function**
  
- | **Notation:  $E(x)$  = arithmetic average, or “expectation” of  $x$**
- | **In words:**
  - >  **$E[ f(x) ]$  = average of possible outcomes of  $f(x)$**
  - >  **$f [ E(x) ]$  = outcome calculated using average  $x$**

## Example

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Given:  $f(x) = \sqrt{x} + 2$

And:  $x = 1, 4, \text{ or } 7$  with equal probability

|  $E(x) = (1 + 4 + 7) / 3 = 4$

|  $f[E(x)] = \sqrt{4} + 2 = 4$

|  $f(x) = 3, 4, \text{ or } [\sqrt{7} + 2] \sim 4.65$   
with equal probability

|  $E[f(x)] = (3 + 4 + 4.65) / 3 \sim 3.88 \leq 4 = f[E(x)]$

## More generally...

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$$E[f(x)] \neq f[E(x)]$$

Example:

| Given:  $f(x) = x^2 + 2$

| And:  $x = 1, 2, \text{ or } 3$  with equal probability

|  $E(x) = (1 + 2 + 3) / 3 = 2$

|  $= 4 + 2 = 6$

|  $f(x) = 3, 6, \text{ or } 11$  with equal probability

|  $E[f(x)] = (3 + 6 + 11) / 3 = 6\frac{2}{3} \neq 6 = f[E(x)]$

## When equal?

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$E [ f(x) ] = f [ E(x) ]$  when  $f(x)$  linear  
This is rarely the case!

**Example:**

- | **Given:**  $f(x) = x + 2$
- | **And:**  $x = 1, 2, \text{ or } 3$  with equal probability
- |  $E(x) = (1 + 2 + 3) / 3 = 2$
- |  $f[E(x)] = 2 + 2 = 4$
- |  $f(x) = 3, 4, \text{ or } 5$  with equal probability
- |  $E[f(x)] = (3 + 4 + 5) / 3 = 4 = f[E(x)]$

## In Words

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- | **Average of all the possible outcomes associated with uncertain parameters,**
- | **generally does not equal**
- | **the value obtained from using the average value of the parameters**

## **Practical Consequences**

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**Because Engineering Systems not linear:**

- | **Unless you work with distribution, you get wrong answer**
- | **answer from a realistic description differs – often greatly – from the answer you get from average or any single assumption**
- | **This is because gains when things do well, do not balance losses when things do not (sometimes they're more, sometimes less)**

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## **WHY IMPORTANT IN PRACTICE**

## Why does Flaw occur?

**Flaw is a pattern in systems design. Why?**

**Several reasons:**

- | **Management fixes design parameters, thus limiting designers**
- | **Designers deliberately choose simplicity**
- | **Need, desire to focus on a single scenario, given limited design resources**
- | **Professional desire for 'certainty'**

## Management fixes parameters

**Designers often constrained by management or client to focus on one scenario**

- | **Management specifies price of product (copper, oil) => opportunities that might be valuable for a higher price are neglected**
- | **Client tells designers to work toward a forecast (1 M customers for Iridium...)**
- | **Client specifies performance requirements (a different way of defining forecast needs), this is typical for military...**

## **Designers choose simplicity**

**Designers often choose single scenario, even when possible ranges are available**

- | **Example: design of oil platforms based on “best estimate” (= P50) of “oil in place”**
  - **Recall data on variability of estimates of oil reserves (uncertainty presentation)**
  - **Geologists present ranges on their estimates (P10 to P90, for example). Uncertainty is clear**
  - **Yet design process focus on a single number!**

## **Need, desire to focus on 1 scenario**

**Detailed design of a system (automobile, oil platform) requires great effort. Yet limited time and resources available**

- | **Hard to create one design => desire not to design many systems for different scenarios**
- | **Computer capabilities have changed, but practice has not adapted (yet)**
- | **Desire to “optimize” => single scenario (Example: design of Iridium satellite system)**



## **Desire for certainty**

**Engineering practice often more comfortable with certainties, precision**

- | **Tradition of scientific rigor, desire for precision – not immediately compatible with vagueness, uncertainty**
- | **A deep issue: designers have selected engineering because it offers rigor, and they feel uncomfortable with vagueness...**

## **Practical Consequences**

**Organizational, personal resistance to recognizing and dealing with uncertainty**

- | **Not current practice for**
  - > **Much management of design work**
  - > **Many client relationships**
- | **Uncomfortable personally for many individuals**

**Although forecast uncertainty demonstrably great, this reality is resisted**

## **How issue arises in practice**

- In practice, design rarely focuses specifically on “average” future conditions
- If you do not recognize distribution of uncertainty, you cannot calculate an average
- Focus typically on “most likely” scenario.
- Formally, not the same as “average”
- Conceptually equivalent however. Mental model is Normal distribution around best estimate, so “most likely” = “average”

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
## **REASONS FOR SYSTEM NON-LINEARITY**

## 3 Reasons for Non-Linearity

- | **System response is non-linear**
- | **System response involves some discontinuity (step change)**
- | **Management rationally imposes a discontinuity**

## System Response is Non-Linear

- | **Economies of Scale: Unit costs decrease with scale of production**
- | **Large initial costs prorated over volume, so that unit costs decrease as scale increases toward capacity**
- | **Increasing marginal costs as scale increases (labor, material costs higher)**



**This is Usual  
Situation!**

## **System involves Discontinuity**

**Discontinuities = special form of non-linearity**

**Discontinuities are Common:**

- | **Expansion of a Project might only occur in large increments (new runways, for example)**
- | **A System may be capacity constrained, so that profitability or values increases with demand up to a point, and then levels off**

## **Management Creates Discontinuity**

- | **Managers or System Operators may decide to take some major decision about a project ...**
- | **to enlarge it or change its function**
- | **this creates a step change in the performance of the system.**
  
- | **This can happen often – and does!**



## A practical example

### Design of oil platform and wells, Golf of Mexico

Reference: Babajide, A., de Neufville, R. and Cardin, M.-A. (2009) "Integrated Method for Designing Valuable Flexibility in Oil Development Projects," Paper 122710-PA, Society of Petroleum Engineers, Projects, Facilities and Construction, Vol.4, no. 2, June 2009


<http://www.spe.org/ejournals/jsp>

## Gulf of Mexico Platform Probability Mass Functions




Note: "Most likely" scenarios are 150 and 100

## Combined PMF



## Comparison of Values



**Actual ENPV  $\neq$  Value based on Mostly Likely Conditions**

## **Take-Aways**

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- | **Do not be a victim of Flaw of Averages**
- | **Do not value projects or make design decisions based on average or most likely forecasts – your results will be WRONG**
- | **Do consider the range of possible events and examine distribution of consequences**
- | **This will be hard – standard paradigm locks on single, “best” estimates. Shift to new, correct paradigm is difficult for many.**